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Abstract 
Integration of immigrants into the labor market is a sizeable policy concern for developed 
democracies. This article argues that government type influences immigrants’ labor market 
outcomes. Since immigrant integration constitutes a multidimensional policy space, differences in 
party preferences and the dynamics of intragovernmental and legislative bargaining make it hard for 
coalition and minority governments to implement effective labor market integration policies. 
Consequently, single-party majority governments are better able to foster the labor market 
integration of immigrants. Fixed-effects estimations in a panel of OECD countries provide evidence 
in favor of this argument. A single-party majority government reduces the employment gap between 
the foreign and the native born population with several percentage points.  
 
 








In most developed democracies, the share of immigrants – inhabitants which were born abroad – in 
the population has steadily increased over the past decades, confer figure 1. As a consequence, the 
issue of immigrant integration – the process in which immigrants become members of their host 
societies (Givens 2007: 72-75) – has come to the forefront of national politics in many developed 
countries. One of the most visible integration challenges in many countries is the gap in the labor 
market experience of natives and foreign born inhabitants.1 Foreign born inhabitants of developed 
democracies often experience large gaps in both rate of employment and unemployment rate in 
comparison with the native born population.  
 
Figure 1: Average share of population foreign born, OECD countries 1995-2013  
 
Note: Source is OECD’s International Migration Database.  
                                                          
1 This is not to devaluate the importance of other types of integration challenges both economic, social and political. 
However, focusing on the gap in national labor markets has the advantage that it is very visible and policy-relevant  
integration issue which can be transparently measured and compared across countries over time.  
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There are substantial economic, social and fiscal costs associated with these gaps, especially within 
the context of the European welfare states.2 Furthermore, research shows that the employment 
status of immigrants matters for public attitudes towards immigrants in general (Hainmueller and 
Hopkins 2014: 241) as well as the effect of immigration on attitudes towards the welfare state 
(Burgoon 2014). Thus, these gaps might matter substantially for the wider political consequences of 
immigration. Consequently, the employment and unemployment gaps, to the extent they exist, are 
some of the most consequential aspects of integration challenges across developed countries.  
 
Which factors in- or decrease the gap between native and foreign born’s employment and 
unemployment rate are thus important topics to explore for both for social scientists and policy 
makers. Especially, since there are significant differences in the size of these labor market outcome 
gaps both between and within countries, confer figure 2. While the gap in the employment rate 
between native and foreign born was 14 percent in Sweden in 2013, inhabitants which were foreign 
born actually had a higher employment rate than native born in the United States in the same year 
according to data from the OECD. While Australia in the years 2000-2013 had a falling gap 
between the employment rate of natives and foreign born, this gap slightly widened in Switzerland 
in the same period. This article theorizes and explores the effect of government type for the labor 
market gap between the native born population and immigrants.  
  
                                                          
2 See Boeri (2010) cited in Burgoon (2014).   
4 
 
Figure 2: Gap between the native and foreign born employment rate, OECD 2013  
 
Note: Source is OECD’s Database.  
 
While immigration and labor market outcomes is a huge topic in labor economics,3 the political 
determinants of immigrant labor market integration outcomes have received less attention in the 
political science and political economy literature. Much of the political science and political 
economy literature has focused on the determinants of attitudes towards immigration and 
immigrants,4 which sometimes treats labor market dynamics as an intermediate variable (Scheve 
and Slaughter 2001). However, this literature mainly concerns individual level factors.  
 
The comparative politics literature, which deals with immigration and immigrant integration, tends 
to focus on countries’ overall stances on immigration and integration approaches (Givens 2007; 
                                                          
3 See reviews mentioned in Foged and Peri (2016: 1). 
4 See Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) for a review. 
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Peters 2015; Helbling et al. 2017; Helbling and Kalkum 2018; Lutz 2018), the link between 
immigration and welfare state politics (Burgoon 2014; Alt and Iversen 2017) or immigration’s 
effect on national party systems (Golder 2016: 485) as well as political parties’ positions on 
immigration (Alonso and da Fonseca, 2011; Akkerman, 2015) rather than actual labor market or 
other integration outcomes. While some political scientists have done research on the labor market 
integration of immigrants, this research has tended to focus on specific policies rather than the 
impact of political factors on variations in integration outcomes across and within countries, see 
Hainmueller et al. (2016).   
 
This article specifically deals with the political determinants of immigrant labor market integration 
outcomes. It thus constitutes one of the first attempts to isolate the political factors which affect 
native/foreign born labor market gaps in a comparative perspective. 
 
The central argument of this article is that since immigration policy and policies which seek to 
integrate immigrants into the national labor market constitute a multidimensional policy area, 
different party positions on immigration within cabinets and legislatures make it hard for a 
government to implement coherent integration policy packages when the passing of these policies 
require interparty bargaining and compromises. Consequently, single-party majority governments 
are better able to introduce policies which decrease the gap between native and foreign born 
employment. Panel data for 28 OECD countries provides substantial evidence in favor of this 
argument. Single-party majority governments decrease the employment rate gap between native and 
foreign born inhabitants by several percentage points. A similar but less statistically robust effect is 
found for the gap in unemployment. The results suggest that the dominant electoral and party 
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systems in developed democracies, and the type of government they produce, could be non-trivial 
institutional hindrances for the integration of immigrants into the national labor market.  
 
Theory: Governments, partisan bargaining and integration as a multidimensional issue 
The core theoretical argument is that a single-party majority government is better able to implement 
policies which integrate immigrants into the national labor market, which in turn improves 
immigrant labor market integration outcomes, compared to other types of governments. Thus, the 
ability to implement more effective integration policies is the mechanism for why single-party 
majority governments are better able to foster immigrant labor market integration compared to other 
types of governments. This is based on the supporting arguments that increasing the labor market 
integration of immigration requires several complementary policies in order to be effective, and that 
compromises between several parties, which have different preferences along the various 
dimensions of the immigrant-integration policy area, make this coherent mix of policies difficult to 
achieve through inter-partisan bargaining. These assumptions and mechanisms are fleshed out in 
greater detail below.  
 
The multidimensionality of integration policy  
The central assumption behind this theoretical argument is that immigration and immigrant 
integration are multidimensional policy areas,5 which is a common approach to studying the politics 
of immigration (Jeong et al. 2011; Hellwig and Kweon 2016: 714). The immigration and integration 
                                                          
5 Immigration and integration policies are often implemented in tandem, and thus issues within one of these areas 
spill over into the other. However, this article still argues that even given a specific immigration policy, integration 
policies still independently matter for immigrant labor market integration.  
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policy areas simultaneously concern several ideological dimensions regarding both social and 
economic equity, issues of fairness, economic efficiency, and labor market segmentation6 as well as 
issues of cultural and national identity etc., which are not necessarily aligned or correlated across a 
single political dimension, for an example the traditional left-right scale, and or alternative non-
economic political dimensions such as the Green-Alternative-Libertarian vs. Traditional-
Authoritarian-Nationalist  (GAL-TAN) dimension (Bakker et al. 2015: 145).7 E.g. a party with a 
low GAL-TAN score might have a commitment to anti-discrimination but not necessarily an 
opposition to labor market segmentation.  
 
This means that different political parties even within the same political bloc can be aligned among 
one dimension of immigration and integration policy, for an example antidiscrimination, while 
being divided on another dimension, for an example labor market segmentation. That immigration 
and subsequent integration policies might be issues which do not clearly align across the traditional 
left-right in developed democracies and can thus separate political parties, which might otherwise 
be ideologically close to each other, are generally recognized within the literature on partisan issue 
emphasis and competition (de Wardt et al. 2014: 987; Hobolt and de Vries 2015: 1167). However, 
                                                          
6 See Alt and Iversen (2017: 229). 
7 Due to the inherent relationship between the immigration and integration area, the ideological dimensions of the 
immigration area might also spill over into the integration area, even though the specific policies within these two 
policy areas can be very different. E.g. requirements for family reunification (immigration) and national programs for 
language training (integration), even though both might relate to the ideological dimension of national identity.  
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the implications of these insights for immigrant integration outcomes have not been previously 
studied.8  
 
The complementarity of labor market integration policies  
Within the policy sphere of integration policy, the core argument is that in order to facilitate the 
integration of immigrants, especially within the national labor market, several complementary 
policies are needed. That is, without some components of a given policy mix, the other components 
might be less or non-effective for labor market integration. An assumption which in line with 
several previous evaluations of the effectiveness of immigrant integration policies. For an example, 
within-company trainee programs for recent immigrants or other active labor market programs 
might be less effective for longer-term employment of immigrants if language training is also not 
provided (Clausen et al. 2009; Sarvimäki and Hämäläinen 2016; Neureiter 2018). Enforcing non-
discrimination policies with regards to minimum wages in the labor market might lower immigrant 




                                                          
8 A potential exception in a recent paper by Lutz (2018), who however only looks at official integration policy and 
whether it is closer to a restrictive-assimilationist model or a liberal-multicultural model and not immigrant labor 
market outcomes.  
9 Confer Butschek and Walter (2014) for a meta-analysis of the effects of active labor market programs, including 
wage subsidies, on immigrant employment.  
9 
 
The dynamics of multi-party policymaking  
The difficulty then arises when several political parties need to agree on a specific mix of immigrant 
labor market integration policies within a coalition cabinet and/or within the legislature in the case 
of a minority government. Some of the policies in a given coherent –  and thus effective –   
integration policy mix might go against the preferences of the negotiating parties on one dimension 
of the integration policy area, while other policies are aligned with the parties’ preferences in 
another dimension.  
 
As a consequence, due to inter-cabinet10 and legislative bargaining and compromises, some 
complementary policies might be removed from the initial more coherent policy mix, which makes 
the overall policy package ineffective in increasing the labor market integration of immigrants. 
Alternatively, a government faced only with a choice of implementing a mix of ineffective labor 
market integration policies might decide not to implement any integration policies at all but this 
would still have the same negative implications for the labor market integration of immigrants. To 
take an example, in a bargaining situation over an immigrant integration policy package, a social-
democratic party might support an employment subsidy for recent immigrants but might also 
support a language training requirement, whereas its leftwing coalition party might support the 
employment subsidy but reject the language training requirement. Another example could be a 
bargaining between the dominant minority government party and its support party, where a pro-
business conservative government party supports cuts to  immigrants’ public transfers as well as an 
                                                          
10 See Martin and Vanberg (2014) for evidence on how final enacted policies reflect inter-coalitional compromises in 
coalition governments.  
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introduction wage for immigrants,11 whereas its coalition/support blue collar-constituency rightwing 
populist party might support the transfer cuts but reject the introduction wage.  
 
This situation, described above, actually arose in Denmark in 2015-2016, where a center-right 
minority government came into power in 2015 and introduced a transfer cut to recent immigrants 
with the help of its rightwing populist support party, the Danish People's Party. However, when the 
government six months later proposed to further the labor market integration of immigrants, 
including recent refugees, by introducing an introduction wage, a policy approach which was even 
supported by the general secretary of the Danish Refugee Council, the Danish People's Party openly 
opposed this policy which was soon abandoned.12 
 
Taking the veto actor approach to policymaking popularized by Tsebelis (2002), more veto actors, 
in this case political parties, both within the government and the parliament, thus constrain the 
policy space within the labor market integration area and make it harder for a government to 
implement new and effective policies and to change current less effective policies for immigrant 
labor market integration. Research specifically on labor market policy also suggests that veto actor 
                                                          
11 See Rosholm and Vejlin (2010) for research on the effects of immigrant transfer cuts.  
12 The frustrated efforts of the Danish center-right minority government to find legislative support for its immigration 
and integration policies, could be contrasted with the experience of another OECD center-right government, the (from 
2011) single-party majority Canadian Harper government, which was able to push through substantial changes to the 
Canadian immigration and integration policies (Omidvar 2016). The years following the Harper government's change 
to a single-party majority government in 2011 saw declines in the labor market gap between the native and foreign 
born Canadian population.  
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dynamics might make it harder for governments to implement their preferred labor market policies 
(Becher 2013). Recent research further suggests that ideologically differences in minimal winning 
coalition governments decrease reform intensity in European countries (Angelova et al. 2018).13  
 
Thus, the existence of several partisan veto actors both within the government and the parliament 
should make it more difficult for an incumbent government to adjust potential non-effective policies 
and to introduce new effective policies to facilitate the labor market integration of immigrants, even 
when this issue becomes relatively more important as the immigrant population increases. This is 
both due to the increased policy stability arising from the existence of several veto actors (Tsebelis 
2002: 2-3) inside and outside the government, and the fact that these partisan veto actors, even 
when ideologically close, can be divided on one or more of the multiple dimensions of immigration 
and integration policy.14 As a consequence, governments, which have to rely on inter-party cabinet 
bargaining and/or support from non-government legislative parties in order to introduce policies, 
are less able to facilitate the labor market integration of immigrants. This is due to the difficulty of 
introducing a mix of labor market integration policies which are both sufficiently complementary to 
be effective and which at the same time do not go against the preferences of one or more of the 
                                                          
13 Lindvall (2017) argues that the dispersion of political power can sometimes increase reform capacity since they 
provide the ability to compensate losers from reforms. However, since, as argued, the integration and immigration 
policy areas are multidimensional in nature and concern many policy dimensions, such as anti-discrimination and 
national identity, which are not strictly economic in nature and provide little ability for loser compensation, this line of 
argumentation is less likely to hold within the integration policy area.  
14 Research using a veto actor framework often measure distance between parties on the traditional left-right scale 
but as argued above integration and immigration policy might divide political parties on other policy dimensions even 
though these parties are close to each on the traditional left-right scale.  
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coalition/bargaining partners in at least one dimension of the immigration/integration policy area. 
This will be the case, even if the all the bargaining partners actually agree that improving the labor 
market integration of immigrants is a desirable goal.  
 
Theoretical implications and hypothesis 
Consequently, a single-party majority government, which does not have to bargain with coalition 
partners and/or seek support from parties in the legislatures in order to decide on and implement 
policies, is in a better position to decide on a policy package which satisfies its own preferences 
with regards to type of labor market integration policies but which still retains the complementary 
policies needed in order for the policy package as a whole to be effective in increasing immigrant 
labor market integration.15 This theoretical reasoning gives rise to the central hypothesis of this 
article.  
H1: Labor market integration of immigrants improves under a single-party majority 
government in comparison with other types of governments.  
 
  
                                                          
15 In the veto actor vocabulary of Tsebelis (2002: 35), a single-party majority government is a single veto player and is 




The dataset used to test the argument that single-party majority government improves immigrant 
labor market integration consists of a panel of 28 OECD countries16 in the years 2000-2013.17 Labor 
market integration of immigrants is measured by the gap between native and foreign born 
inhabitants for both the employment rate and the unemployment rate. The advantage of looking at 
the employment rate as well as the unemployment rate, is that the employment rate also takes into 
account whether immigrants are actually part of the labor force, while unemployment rates are 
usually only calculated using data for individuals which are part of the labor force. These two 
variables thus give a fuller picture of the labor market experiences of foreign born inhabitants in 
comparison with the native population. Higher values on the employment gap variable mean that 
foreign born have an on average lower employment rate in comparison with those native born. 
While higher values on the unemployment gap variable mean that foreign born have a higher 
average unemployment rate in comparison with native born. As a consequence, lower values on 
both variables are proxies for better labor market integration of immigrants. 
 
The use of gaps to measure the distance between the labor market experiences of native and foreign 
born have been applied in other comparative studies of immigrants’ labor market outcomes (Bergh 
2014) and has also been used by other authors in the comparative politics literature (Burgoon 2014). 
Thus, gaps in employment and unemployment are arguable meaningful measures of immigrants' 
relative labor market experiences, and thus their level of labor market integration, since they 
                                                          
16 The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States.  
17 Coverage is based on the OECD labor market data which becomes available after 2000 and the coverage of the 
Comparative Political Dataset 1960-2013 (Armington et al. 2015). 
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directly measure how attached immigrants are to the national labor market compared to the native 
population. However, the effect of a single-party majority government on immigrant labor market 
integration is similar if the absolute foreign born employment and unemployment rates are used as 
the measures of immigrant labor market integration. These results can be found in appendix B. Data 
for both native and foreign born employment and unemployment rates are from the OECD's 
migration statistics database accessed through the OECD’s main online database OECD.Stat 
(accessed on July 6th 2016).  
 
Single-party majority government is a dummy based on data from the Database of Political 
Institutions (Cruz, Keefer and Scartascini 2016). It takes the value 1 if the government's Herfindahl 
index score is equal to 1, which means that only one party holds government cabinet seats, and if 
the government party controls at least 50 percent of the seats in the legislature. Otherwise, it takes 
the value 0. In around 17 percent of the country-years in the dataset, the country was governed by a 
single-party majority government.18   
 
As an additional political control variable, I include a measure of the effective number of legislative 
parties. The logic of the theory section, about immigrant integration as a multidimensional issue and 
the difficulty of achieving coherent integration policies from partisan bargaining, should also apply 
to partisan fragmentation in the legislature. However, as the article’s hypothesis concerns the effect 
of a single-party majority government, whose occurrence could be endogenous to the effective 
number of legislative parties, controlling for the number of legislative parties is necessary to isolate 
the independent effect of single-party majority government on immigrant integration. Data for this 
variable is from the Comparative Political Dataset (Armingeon et al. 2015). As a final political 
                                                          
18 Not all countries experience a single-party majority government during the analysed period. This issue is dealt with 
in the robustness test section in appendix F.  
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control variable, I include the share of leftwing cabinet members from the Comparative Political 
Dataset in order to hold the ideological makeup of the government constant. Leftwing and 
rightwing government might pursue different immigration and integration policies while in office, 
and the prevalence of single-party majority government might be larger under either leftwing or 
rightwing governments in certain countries.19 Furthermore, recent research even suggest that 
leftwing parties have more coherent stances on immigration policy and therefore potentially also on 
integration policy (Carvalho and Ruedin 2018).  
 
I also include GDP growth and the national unemployment rate as control variables in order to 
control for the general state of the economy and the labor market, which could be affected by the 
government type and thus affect the relative labor market experiences of immigrants, both through 
an effect of immigrant employment and unemployment rate and the employment and 
unemployment rate of the native born population. Since the article’s theoretical argument is that 
labor market integration of immigrants improves under a single-party majority government due to 
labor market integration policies, these controls are necessary. The unemployment rate data is from 
the Comparative Political Dataset (Armingeon et al. 2015), while GDP growth data is from the 
OECD’s national accounts database, accessed through its main online database OECD.Stat 
(extracted on March 14th 2016).  
 
As a final economic control in some of the later estimations, I also include a control for government 
spending to proxy for the size and scope of the national welfare state. In both public discourse and 
research, the relationship between welfare state spending and immigration integration is both 
                                                          
19 If, for an example, either the left or the right is united in one large party, while its ideological counterpart is 
fragmented in several smaller parties.  
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controversial20 and potentially endogenous (Boräng 2015: 224). However, since recent research 
suggests that welfare states generosity might affect the type of migrants entering a country (Boräng 
2015), the control should not be left out, especially since the level of public spending is also 
endogenous to government fragmentation (Bawn and Rosenbluth 2006) and thus potentially the 
occurrence of a single-party majority government. As the measure for the size and scope of the 
government spending, I use general government outlays as a percentage of GDP. Data is from the 
Comparative Political Dataset (Armingeon et al. 2015). This measure is arguable a crude measure 
of the welfare state spending but it is available for most country-years of the panel. However, 
replacing the government spending variable with other measures of welfare state generosity such as 
unemployment insurance replacement rates from the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset 
(Scruggs et al. 2013) yields similar results for the effect of single-party majority government on 
immigrant labor market integration.21  
 
Finally, in later specifications, I include controls for the structure and size of the immigrant 
population. Immigrant are not necessarily a homogenous group, and different types of immigrants 
might face different types of difficulties in the national labor mark. Furthermore, the government 
type might also affect total number of immigrants and the type of immigrants allowed to enter the 
country, it is necessary to investigate whether a potential labor market integration effect of single-
party majority government reflect mainly immigration policies rather than integration policies. A 
single-party majority government might - according to the above theoretical argument - also be able 
                                                          
20 See Bergh (2014) for a discussion of Sweden.  
21 Results are available upon request. There is also much fewer observations for the replacement rates variables, 
which is another reason why I have chosen to stick with the general government outlays variable.  
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to implement more coherent immigration policies, which might also increase immigrant labor 
market integration. However, the argument is still that even given the number and type of 
immigrants, a single-party majority government should be able to introduce more effective policies 
to facilitate these immigrants’ integration into the national labor market.  
 
The control variables capturing the type and number of immigrants are refugees as share of total 
population as well as the percent of total population which is foreign born. Refugee population 
share should proxy for an immigration policy which has a large humanitarian component and the 
existence of relatively weaker immigrants, which are not necessarily easily integrated into the 
national labor market. Foreign born’s share of total population could proxy for a country’s general 
stance towards immigration. Furthermore, the share of population foreign born might in itself 
directly affect the employment and unemployment experiences of immigrants.22 Data for the 
refugee population is from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (accessed on April 8th 
2019), population data is from the Comparative Political Dataset (Armingeon et al. 2015), while 
data for the percent of the population foreign born is from the OECD's International Migration 
Database (accessed from OECD.Stat on July 6th 2016).  
 
Regarding potential additional control variables, I choose not to control for any measures of actual 
immigration policies such as the dimensions of the Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) 
(Ruedin, Alberti and D’Amato 2015: 6-8; Kogan 2016: 336). Given that the article’s theoretical 
argument is that a single-party majority government would increase the labor market integration of 
                                                          
22 Research suggest that additional immigration might affect the labor market experiences of other immigrants more 
than the native population at least with regards to wages (Ottaviano and Peri 2011).  
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immigrants through more coherent immigrant integration policies, including measures of actual 
immigration policies and other related policies in the statistical analysis would be an example of 
including bad controls and would thus be a source of bias for estimating the potential effect of 
single-party majority government (Angrist and Pischke 2009: 64-68). Additionally, it is not obvious 
that all the dimensions in the MIPEX and other of immigration and integration policy indexes (de 
Haas et al. 2015) are actual capturing policies which de-facto better integrate non-native into the 
national labor market.23 Furthermore, the MIPEX index's does not have full coverage over the 
analyzed time period. Consequently, I have chosen measures of the actual relative labor market 
attachment of immigrants as the dependent variables rather than a measure of official integration 
policy. Descriptive statistics for all variables included in the analysis can be seen in appendix A.   
 
  
                                                          
23 E.g., in the distinction between a restrictive-assimilationist model or a liberal-multicultural model which forms the 
basis of the integration policy measure used by Lutz (2018), it is not clear whether one of these model are necessarily 
superior to the other in fostering immigrant labor market integration. Regarding the MIPEX index, it is not clear 
whether better scores on indicators relating to the MIPEX Index's "Family reunion" dimension have any positive 
effects on immigrant labor market integration. On the other hand, indicators related to the MIPEX index's "Labour 




To estimate the effect of a single-party majority government on native/foreign born labor market 
gaps, I run a number of OLS regressions with country-fixed effects. Using fixed-effects enables me 
to analyze deviations in labor market gaps from the country-mean. It also enables me to hold 
general characteristics and history of each country constant, which might have large effects on 
immigration and general labor market policy such as the language of the country,24 its colonial 
history and its general political-economic and welfare state model. All of these factors might affect 
the ability to integrate immigrants into the labor market.25  
 
To control for a general trend in immigrant labor market integration over the analyzed period, year-
fixed effects are included as well. In order to address issues of autocorrelation, standard errors are 
clustered at the country-level. The estimation can be seen in the equation below, where countries 
are indexed by i and years by t. Gap is the native/foreign born employment or unemployment gap. 
Single.maj.gov. is the single-party majority government dummy, while N.parties is the effective 
number of legislative parties, Leftwing is the share of leftwing cabinet members, while X is a vector 
of control variables. γt and δi  are the year- and country-fixed effects respectively while ε is the error 
term. All political variables are lagged two years, since the integration policies would take some 
time to actually be implemented and affect the labor market gap, after they have been passed or 
                                                          
24 Presumably, integration of immigrants might be easier in English speaking countries or in countries where the native 
language is very widely spoken and taught abroad.  
25 Especially, when taking the influential Varieties of Capitalism approach to comparative differences in public policies 
and outcomes (Hall and Soskice 2001), the issue of fundamental institutional and historical difference between 
countries is potentially very important. 
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decided on in the cabinet and the legislature. However, the main results are similar if the political 
variables are only lagged one year.26 




In table 1, the results from the test of the effect of single-party majority government on the 
native/foreign born employment gap can be seen. The results in columns 1-4 provide evidence in 
favor of a positive effect of single-party majority government on immigrant labor market 
integration. With a single-party majority government in office, then two years later the gap between 
native and foreign born employment rate decreases with two percentage points with the effect being 
statistically significant at the p<0.01-level. A reduction in employment gap of about two percentage 
points would for many countries be enough to eliminate the native/foreign born employment gap 
almost entirely and would mean the integration of thousands of immigrants into the labor market. 
Thus, the substantial effect of this decrease is far from trivial. This result is robust to controlling for 
government spending, refugees as share of population and the share of population foreign born, 
which suggests that the effect of a single-party majority government on the reduction of the 
native/foreign born employment gap not only reflects pure immigration policies but also labor 
market integration policies. 
 
The national rate of unemployment is positively associated with the gap between native and foreign 
born employment rate, which indicates that immigrants might face relative disadvantages in labor 
                                                          
26 Results can be found in appendix C.  
21 
 
markets with high unemployment, which is hardly surprising. The share of leftwing cabinet 
members is associated with a larger employment gap, which indicates that leftwing governments 
might have more difficulties implementing successful integration policies in comparison with more 
center- or rightwing governments. However, this effect is not statistically significant when 
introducing a control for the share of population foreign born.27 While the effective number of 
legislative parties have the expected positive association with the gap between native and foreign 
born, the effect is not statistically significant. None of the other control variables have any 
statistically significant effect on the employment gap, except refugees as share of the population. As 
mentioned, refugees might be an especially socio-economically weak immigrant group, which 
might be especially hard to integrate in the native labor market, which the results suggest is the 
case. The results above are even robust to controlling for the native population employment rate, 
which suggests that the results are not driven by comparing country-years with extraordinary high 
native born employment rates to country-years with relatively low native born employment rates. 
These results can be seen in appendix D.  
 
  
                                                          
27 The inclusion of this variable somewhat lowers the number of observations, but as shown below, this does, if 
anything, increase the effect of single-party majority government.  
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Table 1: Single-party majority government and employment gap 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 





















































Refugees  as share of population - - 
359.48 
(169.61)** 
  578.18 
(148.17)*** 
 
Share of population foreign born - - - 
2.19 
(8.34) 
Country-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of countries  28 28 28 27 
Number of observations 379 379 372 237 
Within R-squared  0.25 0.25 0.27 0.44 
Note: Dependent variable is native/foreign born employment gap. Single-party majority government, effective number of legislatives parties and 
share of leftwing cabinet members are lagged two years. Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. *: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. 
 
There seems to be evidence in favor of a non-trivial effect of single-party majority government on 
the employment rate gap between immigrants and native born. In table 2, the employment gap 
variable is replaced by the unemployment gap variable to test whether a similar labor market 
integration effect exists for the unemployment rate. While the single-party majority government 
dummy has a negative sign, which means that immigrant unemployment is relatively lower under 
single-party majority governments in comparison with other types of governments, this effect is 
only statistically significant with the addition of the controls in column 4. While the argument that a 
single-party majority government improves immigrant labor market integration still receives some 
support in the case of the unemployment gap, the effect seems to be less statistically robust than in 
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the case of the employment gap and seems contingent on holding the characteristics of the 
immigrant population constant.  
 
Table 2: Single-party majority government and unemployment gap 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 







  -1.36 
(0.31)*** 

















































Share of population foreign born - - - 
-8.53 
(11.84) 
Country-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of countries  28 28 28 28 
Number of observations 379 379 372 237 
Within R-squared  0.30 0.30 0.27   0.43 
Note: Dependent variable is foreign born/native unemployment gap. Single-party majority government, effective number of legislatives parties and 





Visualized effects over time  
The results above provide evidence in favor of the theoretical argument that a single-party majority 
government is better able to facilitate immigrant integration into the national labor market. 
However, the above results rely on fixed-effects estimation, so we can only conclude that the 
average labor market gap seems to be lower in the years where a single-party majority government 
was in office two years before in comparisons with other years. So, to further explore how the 
occurrence of a single-party majority government affects the native/foreign born employment and 
unemployment gap in a more dynamic way, in figure 3a and 3b, I plot the predicted employment 
and unemployment gaps in the years just before and just after a single-party majority government 
comes into office.28 In this way, it is possible to explore trends in the employment gap in the years 
before a single-party majority government comes into office and to see how long it takes for this 
government’s policies to come into effect.   
 
For both the predicted employment and unemployment gap, a clear pattern emerges from figure 3. 
In all the years preceding the occurrence of a single-party majority government, the predicted labor 
market gap is quite high and not statistically significantly different from each other and most other 
years. However, as in the main estimations from table 1 and 2, two years after a single-party 
majority government takes over, both the employment and unemployment gap begin to trend 
downwards, and three years after the single-party majority government comes into office the 
predicted labor market gap is about half the size it was in the other years. An effect which is 
                                                          
28 The figures are based on estimations where the single-party majority government dummy is replaced with dummies 
which measure the number of years before and after a single-party majority government comes into office. These 
regression results can be found in appendix E.  
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arguable substantially and statistically significant. As mentioned, figure 3 also shows that the 
takeover of a single-party majority government is not preceded by a general trend towards a lower 
native/foreign born labor market gap. Consequently, this graphing alleviates some of the potential 
endogeneity concerns about the relationship between the occurrence of a single-party majority 
government and the decrease in the native/foreign born labor market gap. Endogeneity could be an 
issue if a single-party majority government was more likely to emerge during times of downward 
trending native/foreign born labor market gaps. However, the results reported in figure 3 suggest 
that this is not the case. Figure 3a and 3b do provide further evidence of a non-trivial effect of a 
single-party majority government on the labor market integration of immigrants but suggest that the 
effect might occur more profoundly when the this type of government has been in office for some 
years. This is plausible given that integration policies would take some to be decided on, 
implemented and eventually have an actual effect of the labor market experiences of immigrants.  
 
Figure 3: Predicted labor market gap before and after single-party majority government takeover 
a: Employment gap b. Unemployment gap 
  




The empirical results show evidence in favor of the argument that immigrant labor market 
integration improves under a single-party majority government. The results above are robust to 
various additional robustness tests which can be found in appendix F.29  
 
Conclusion  
Labor market integration of immigrants has become one of the most discussed policy areas within 
developed democracies in recent years. This article has made the argument that the 
multidimensionality of the immigration and integration policy area and the need for complementary 
policies in order to facilitate the integration of immigrants into the national labor market make it 
hard to achieve effective integration policies through partisan bargaining both within the cabinet 
and within the legislature. Consequently, the labor market integration of immigrants should be 
relatively better under single-party majority governments, who are better able to introduce and 
implement a more coherent and effective mix of integration policies than other types of 
governments.  
 
Results from panel data regressions in 28 OECD countries support this argument. Even holding 
country-specific characteristics constant, the occurrence of a single-party majority government 
decreases the employment gap between native and foreign born inhabitants with about two 
percentage points, an effect which is statistically robust to several sensitivity checks. A similar but 
somewhat smaller and statistically less robust effect is found for the unemployment gap. Single-
party majority government improves immigrant integration in comparison with other types of 
government at least within the labor market area.  
                                                          
29 Appendix G contains an additional analysis which provides evidence in favor of the theoretical mechanism.  
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These results hold significant implications for labor market integration policies within developed 
democracies. On the positive side, democratic governments are presumably sometimes able to 
implement policies which improve the labor market integration of immigrants. However, the most 
common government types in most developed democracies, coalition and/or minority governments, 
which are especially common within Europe, are apparently less able to decide on and implement 
effective labor market integration policies.  
 
The results of this article suggest that many countries face substantial political obstacles for more 
effective labor market integration of immigrants in a time where this issue becomes increasingly 
pressing. The party and electoral systems which give rise to multi-party and minority governments 
might thus indirectly be a non-trivial hindrance for better labor market integration of immigrants 
within developed democracies. This article thus adds to the classical and continuing scholarly and 
normative debate about the effects, desirability and relative trade-offs between different types of 
democratic governments and the electoral systems which affect these (Taylor and Herman 1971; 
Carey and Hix 2011; Chang et al. 2011: 223-233; Lindvall 2017). In a time where electoral system 
reform is increasingly being discussed – especially in majoritarian political systems30 – these trade-
offs, including those which follow from this article, are important to keep in mind both in general 
public discussions and future research.  
  
                                                          
30 For an example, French president Emmanuel Macron’s plan to introduce more proportionally in the French electoral 
system, ironically after the second round of the French legislative election of 2017 gave his own party a majority in the 
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